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Paul Fulcher, European Head of ALM Solutions at Nomura Regulation must adapt to market developments. The long delays in implementing Solvency II resulted in an inevitable need to update the rules. But Paul Fulcher, European Head of ALM Solutions at Nomura, argues that the original commitment to value-at-risk and counter-cyclicality are contradictory and have produced the complex mess we now know as the Long-term Guarantees package. Traditionally, insurance regulation has focused on the long-term ability of insurers to meet claims as they fall due. The challenge for regulators has always been how to monitor this ability at intermediate points to ensure timely intervention. Under the current (“Solvency I”) regimes across Europe this is typically a retrospective assessment, without explicit reference to market data and a reliance on techniques such as book values, asset-based discounting, implicit margins and actuarial judgement. Solvency II, in its purest form, changes this by introducing a market-consistent valuation of assets and liabilities and a risk-sensitive capital requirement calibrated to a one year 99.5% VAR. Existing techniques are replaced by market prices, exogenous “risk-free” rates, explicit capital, and objective data. Solvency II is overhauling many established processes and in assessing its impact it is important to bear in mind that regulation is ultimately about political objectives rather than being an exact science. The key political rationale behind the original directive was to introduce a harmonised, modern, risk-based and prospective assessment of solvency. But insurers cannot be risk-free unless capital is infinite. And the level of acceptable risk is also political. In particular, there is nothing sacred about a 99.5% confidence level assessed over a one year horizon. Different confidence intervals and different assessment periods – including run-off – could have equally met this political rationale.Home » Knowledge Base » LTG » Conflicting objectives led to Solvency II LTG ‘mess’
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Excellent article with which I generally agree. I do think the eurozone difficulties and the continuing lack of mutual confidence in the management of the single currency are major contributory factors to the mess in which we find ourselves. I personally would have preferred that the Commission and EIOPA would have adopted a much more flexible approach to transition for legacy business.
Thanks Seamus. Yes the eurozone difficulties are a major factor – and make a one-size-fits-all approach difficult. For example the issues faced by German insurers with long-term guarantees (ultra-low long-duration yields) are rather different from those in the periphery (high sovereign spreads). Indeed, to be fair to everyone involved, the Solvency II process was rather unlucky with its timing as the system was designed in the pre-financial-crisis “Goldilocks economy” of stable markets – unfortunately as we know Goldilocks turned out to be a fairy tale. E.g. the CEA paper I refer to that said Solvency II would have only minor, and benign, impacts was released in March 2007, just as the subprime crisis was starting to become a concern.
Some more thoughts on the Pillar 1 problem – comments welcome!
There are at least two separate issues – valuation and capital requirements.
In relation to valuation, measuring the fair or market-consistent values of both assets and liabilities is at least very useful information for stakeholders. There is solid and to best of my knowledge generally uncontroversial guidance as to how to measure fair or market-consistent values for assets, including guidance on discounts for illiquidity. (An exception may be measurement of fair values of sovereign and similar bond assets within the euro countries). Actuaries have developed techniques for measurement of fair or market-consistent valuation of liabilities, but there is a lack of consensus on recognition of the liquidity characteristics of liabilities. If one interprets fair or market-consistent value as corresponding to the amount which would pass between two willing parties exchanging liabilities, then it is easy to establish that an illiquid liability has a lesser value than an otherwise similar liquid liability but very difficult to establish by how much. Replication arguments used by proponents of the ‘illiquidity premium’ are not necessarily convincing. This is not to suggest that fair value is the only possible balance sheet basis, and there are good arguments for the net effects of movements in fair values not to go through P&L. Measuring the balance sheet on fair value concepts does not of itself introduce asset bias.
However own funds measured on a fair value basis, even properly taking into account liquidity characteristics of liabilities as well as of assets, will be volatile because of cyclical and other market influences. This poses the challenge of how to flex capital and solvency standards so that the volatility does not become destabilising. At a minimum it seems likely that the 99.5{fe5cadadbb54208ab3a9fe6506ec07abb84961fe5f7860e6b90ac4d8e68f73da} confidence requirement should be able to be flexed ‘through the cycle’ – higher when markets are at their most buoyant and lower when they are weak. While such flexibility is desirable, it may well not be enough to deal with all sets of foreseeable circumstances. It certainly is desirable that other contracyclical tools are available, such as the power to lengthen recovery periods. I think I can see that it may be desirable to retain additional flexibility in relation to movements in longer-term asset and liability values as compared with movements in shorter-term values.
Thanks for the article Paul – quite a useful read. I hadn’t realised the extent to which different parts of Europe had been entrenched in different ‘optimal’ investment strategies.
If there was one unifying political objective that favours a particular asset class – I would have thought (especially in current times), that it perhaps ought to be infrastructure.
Thanks Parit. Yes, another issue with Solvency II is that reconciling the objectives of a one-size-fits-all common regime with limiting disruption to existing business models is very difficult when the starting points of different countries are so different. I would agree with your comment on infrastructure and indeed the recent Green Paper on long-term investment was focused on this point. However, the current LTG package doesn’t appear to offer any solutions and indeed some aspects – e.g. the strict limits on matching premium eligiblity – could make infrastructure investment even more difficult. Treatment of infrastructure has been raised before – e.g. during the QIS5 process – but EIOPA have previously declined to provide any special treatment and have instead suggested use of internal models.
Further to Parit’s comments, EIOPA have responded to the Commission’s request and today published their preliminary proposals on the treatment of long-term investments such as infrastructure. But disappointingly their analysis appears to have been purely technical – based on evidence of actual market volatility which is lacking in many cases – and hence their conclusion is that no changes are warranted to the Standard Formula treatment of such assets. What they appear to have ignored is the political policy angle – i.e. what sort of behaviour Solvency II is designed to encourage.